The emergence of patronage and changing forms of rent-seeking in East Central Europe by Szanyi, Miklós
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cpce20
Post-Communist Economies
ISSN: 1463-1377 (Print) 1465-3958 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cpce20
The emergence of patronage and changing forms
of rent-seeking in East Central Europe
Miklós Szanyi
To cite this article: Miklós Szanyi (2019): The emergence of patronage and changing
forms of rent-seeking in East Central Europe, Post-Communist Economies, DOI:
10.1080/14631377.2019.1693738
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/14631377.2019.1693738
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 03 Dec 2019.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 128
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
ARTICLE
The emergence of patronage and changing forms of
rent-seeking in East Central Europe
Miklós Szanyia,b
aInstitute of World Economics (KRTK MTA) Budapest, Hungary; bFaculty of Economics and Business
Administration, Szeged University, Szeged, Hungary
ABSTRACT
The foreign direct investment (FDI)-led development path of the
East-Central European (ECE) countries has been queried most
recently. Using mainly the evidence of Hungary and Poland the
paper analyses one of the potential reasons of this strategic turn:
the struggle between political elites. One elite was bound to the
strong presence of multinational business and the institutions of the
‘competition state’. Their positions were challenged by another poli-
tical elite that allied mainly with local bourgeoisie. One main arena of
conﬂicts is the economy where political elites try to widen their
inﬂuence in order to gain ﬁnancial support. New forms of rent-
seeking and corruption became possible after the V4 accession to
the European Union (EU) when the ﬂow of ﬁnancial aid increased. Aid
was channelled to partisan ﬁrms in public procurement tenders that
made legal corruption possible. Political and social control over this
practice declined with the demise of classic program parties’ role in
politics and the raise of populist ‘business ﬁrm’ political parties.
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East-Central European countries, new member states of the European Union, underwent
fundamental political, economic and social changes in their transition process from com-
munism to democracy. Their economies were substantially restructured and modernised,
market economic institutional frameswere established, political democracy was introduced,
civil society strengthened. All these changes made the transition process of the region
politically irreversible and economically successful. Yet, since the turn of the millennium
popularity of these new achievements declined in the society: euro-sceptic and anti-
globalist arguments were emphasised in political rhetoric and policies in a number of
countries (most notably in Hungary, Poland and Czechia). The process seemed to culminate
when Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán declared that Hungary’s main political ambi-
tion was to reconsider the country’s liberal democratic development and replace it with
illiberal democracy (Orbán, 2014)1. A term such as illiberal democracy can be interpreted as
an antonym to liberal democracy in the simplistic formulation used in a political speech. The
speech was about the rejection of liberal values and their replacement by ‘something else’,
a not properly deﬁned concept.
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This paper focuses on deﬁning and evaluating this ‘something else’with special regard to
the national economy of ECE countries. The main argument of the paper is that the collapse
of traditional ideological parties and the advance of populist ‘business ﬁrm’ parties can be
regarded a systemic element of ECE capitalist development. The lack of strong ideological
underpinnings, low social appreciation of the democratic political institutions and compe-
titive market economic institutions opened up opportunities for ‘business ﬁrm’ parties to
acquire and monopolise political power. The latter aim is achieved through the systematic
destruction of democratic institutions and organisations. Strong political positions are used
for business capture, which can be exercised through regulatory tools. Including, the use of
measures oﬀering selective advantages and disadvantages. These policies as well as an
increase in state ownership are usually labelled as steps of economic patriotism. However, as
this paper argues they are rather measures aimed to dominate large parts of the economy
by the government and the ruling party. Competition is frequently put oﬀ entirely on closely
regulated markets to favour political clients. This is a system of patronage rather than
economic patriotism. The paper sees the ultimate goal of patronage and business capture
in political rent-seeking. However, the lack of competition and the repression of social
control also increases the risk of corruption. There is ample empirical evidence in the case of
Hungary that the level of corruption increased parallel with the decline of political and social
control over government policies. This ambition is not restricted to Hungary. We can see
similar systemic political development trends in Poland. Moreover, elements of Hungarian
and Polish patterns have surfaced in other countries, including Czechia, Romania and
Bulgaria. This points to a systemic East-Central European feature behind these observations.
The paper consists of three main parts. First, we explore the general socio-economic
setting in the region and point out the reasons of departure from the general consensus
regarding the socio-political trends of the 1990s’ transition. The departure was present in
the changes aﬀecting elements of the democratic political system and the liberal market
economic frame. In the second part, we continue with the analysis of patronage and
business capture in the region. We describe the steps of political monopoly creation, the
factors that allowed the emergence of ‘illiberal democracy’ and the attempts of a strong
populist governments to capture dominant positions in the economy. In the third part,
the changing forms of rent-seeking and corruption are described. Although rent-seeking
and corruption had been present throughout the entire ECE transition, this practice has
gradually become systematised and directly used for strengthening the political mono-
poly of the ruling parties. Most recently, legal corruption is used to reap political rents
from state-owned companies and partisan private ﬁrms. We conclude in the ﬁnal part.
2. ECE’s FDI-led transition path and the reasons for departure from it
Systemic change and transition in East Central Europe can be interpreted as a historic success
story (Kornai, 2006). In the context of world history, this was the only total political transfor-
mation towards Western values that took place peacefully. Moreover, this was achieved at
a rapid pace. It was formally completed with the successful accession of ECE countries to the
European Union in 2004,2 although numerous problems and hardships did arise during the
process. Guidelines were designed, especially in the ﬁrst 5–10 years, according to the general
objectives of the (post-) Washington Consensus’ SLIP (stabilisation, liberalisation, institution
building and privatisation); however, details of speciﬁc policies were not created in seamless
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fashion. Cernat (2006) called the established political and market economic institutional mix
‘cocktail capitalism’, referring to the contradictions and the frequently missing coordination
within the institutional system. Roland (2000) gives a comprehensive summary of the main
transition tasks and policies, and analyses the results of diﬀerent policy solutions. Despite the
occasionally patchwork-like institutions and conceptually diﬀerent policy solutions to various
tasks stemming from the implementation of SLIP, considerable convergence evolved over
time in the development patterns of ECE countries.
This convergence was described as an FDI-led development model (Szanyi, 2003), which
is based on economic restructuring andmodernisation reliant on foreign direct investments.
Only in hindsight was the focal and long-term role of multinational businesses in the ECE’s
development evaluated. Results were rather mixed. The highly successful process of struc-
tural change increases in productivity and international competitiveness (measured, for
example, by growing exports and a positive trade balance) ultimately slowed down. Further
increases in multinational aﬃliates’ local income generation has become increasingly
diﬃcult (Szalavetz, 2017).3 The share of foreign-owned (mostly multinational) companies
increased to over 50% in the majority of economic sectors in terms of production, invest-
ments and exports. Many observers regarded this high foreign share as excessive. Szentes
(2005-2006) wrote about an unhealthy asymmetric interdependence. Nölke and Vliegenhart
(2009) conceptualised problems of the FDI-led development on amore general level in their
dependent market economy (DME) model. However, DME’s critics called attention to the
fact that multinational business’ strong inﬂuence did not necessarily curtail ECE countries’
governments. They could generate income to ﬁnance policies independent of the multi-
national-dominated parts of their economies (mainly through EU transfers). Thus, ECE
governments could still act relatively independently from global business and use this
room of manoeuvre for purposes such as establishing local entities competing against
multinational companies (Szanyi, 2016b).
Both the FDI-led development model and the DME model were attempts to detect
strong similarities between ECE economies that could characterise a speciﬁc capitalist
model of the region in the framework of the varieties of capitalism literature. Two
important features of this capitalist model could then be the strong integration of these
economies into multinational companies’ global value chains (DME) and the vigorous
direct state intervention in shaping economic processes that became more and more
evident in the region during the 2000s and thereafter (state-orchestrated revision of the
FDI-led model). The main topic of this study is this latter feature4, which stands in sharp
contrast to the FDI-led model which dominated developments during the 1990s.
Increasing state intervention could be observed in many countries during and after
2008–2009 crisis. Typically, however, long-established market economies regarded this as
a temporary necessity until macroeconomic stability was achieved or too big to fail banks
and other companies were ﬁnancially restructured. The state’s increased direct involve-
ment was not expected in the long-run. The situation in ECE countries was diﬀerent:
governments expanded their activity over certain sectors well before the crisis and have
continued to do so5. But what was the reason of this change? Why was FDI-led develop-
ment model dropped?
Naczyk (2014) explained this phenomenon as a change in the main priority of national
governments, which shifted to pursue policies according to their perceived national interests.
During the 1990s the main ambition was to consolidate the transition towards free market
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capitalism, an ambition was heavily supported by the international advisor community’s SLIP
program. The programwas accepted and applied because ECE societies had weak ideological
underpinnings and could not develop competitive alternative visions with regard to the
transition process. SLIP favoured multinational business penetration too. The process also
unfolded in countries where foreign direct investmentwas less welcome (e.g. Czechia, Poland)
in comparison to Hungary. Drahokupil (2008) stressed that the introduction of SLIP was
supported and carried out by the local bureaucratic elite (‘the comprador service sector6’).
According to Naczyk (2014) the change in attitude towards FDI in the region during the 2000s
was a logical change as economic patriotism’s prominence rose. The irreversibility of the
transition was not in danger any more during this period and especially after 2004 (2007)
accessions to the European Union. Therefore, governments turned to economic patriotism’s
traditional focus: supporting local business vis-a-vis global enterprises. This introduced a new
round of competition between the ‘comprador service sector’ and the de nouveau local
business elites.
Kornai (2006) provides a broader overview of the social background of disappointment
with the transition process in the 1990s. The ﬁrst set of worries consisted of factors aﬀecting
personal income distribution. Transformational crisis and deep restructuring eliminatedmany
jobs and created massive structural unemployment, which was in sharp contrast to the job
security of the communist regimes. Inequality grew by 15–40% during the 1990s, total
employment levels declined to 70–85% of the 1989 levels and unemployment grew from
mostly zero to 8–20% (Kornai, 2006, pp. 229–231). The comfort of the citizens was further
deteriorated by growing corruption and declining public security with crime rates tripling.
The other source of social disappointment could be traced to cognitive problems. High
hopes at the beginning of the transition process did not manifest: transformational
recession cut back living standards. Real convergence was slower than expected and
even stalled during the 2000s, especially in the rural areas (with growing regional inequal-
ities). A further important cognitive problem was the points of comparison for personal
welfare, individual freedom, access to consumer goods, etc. Most ECE countries felt more
or less comfortable, when comparing their living standards with Soviet counterparts,
but – despite increasing levels of well-being – there was still a large gap with neighbour-
ing traditional democracies like Austria or Germany. This shift in the baseline of compar-
ison increased frustration in ECE societies. Last, but not least, memories of hardships in the
overturn regimes faded very quickly.
We can complement Kornai’s list of factors explaining disappointment with the liberal FDI-
led growth pathwith further elements observed during and after 2008–2009 crisis. Trust in the
neoliberal agenda of the great moderation period was shaken worldwide. The theoretical
background of the FDI-led development model was further eroded during the crisis and until
now, no new theoretical concept was put forward to replace it – the revival of neo-Keynesian
and protectionist concepts can hardly be regarded as adequate answers to the challenges of
globalisation. Economic patriotism and even nationalism spread in economic policy even
aﬀecting the United States of America. We are witnessing a worldwide cognitive problem, as
the international and the general social consensus seems to have broken.
The spectacular growth in the 1950s and 1960s as well as the successful consolidation
attempts in the 1970s and 1980s were based on internal social and international com-
promises. The neoliberal policy agenda’s social consensus in ECE rested on the same
fundamental pillars. The horrors of the Second World War created a basic understanding
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that personal and national ambitions should be limited and more cooperation within
society and among states should be applied. As a reward for giving up areas of personal
and national sovereignty economic growth and prosperity provided conditions for con-
tinuous development of welfare services and an increase in living standards. The most
obvious example of this is the development of the European integration process.
However, declining international competitiveness of the European economic space and
slow economic growth limited the necessary resources to further increase welfare.
Memories of war faded and were replaced by new impressions of violence manifesting
in inter alia terrorism, and new social problems created by massive waves of migration.
Hence, the eﬀect of both former threats and the rewards from welfare services declined.
The crisis of traditional European political parties, which led the political competition for
the 70 years after 1945 became obvious in 2017–8 parliamentary elections inter alia in
France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and Austria.
Traditional political parties’ decline in popularity was especially dramatic in the ECE
region, where their positions began to erode even before 2007/2008 crisis. In his analysis
of ECE party structures, Cohen (1999) diﬀerentiated between traditional program parties
and ‘business ﬁrmparties’. Programparties were supported by elites (e.g. socialists, Christian
democrats, liberals, nationalists) who shared ideologically embedded values and programs .
In contrast, Cohen introduced the idea of ‘mass elite’ to describe a political elite with the
characteristics of the mass, i.e. the average voter responsible for forming ‘business-ﬁrm’
parties. This – militantly anti-communist – elite is primarily motivated by short-term self-
interest, as opposed to ideological commitment (Cohen, 1999, p. 5–6).
In the post-crisis era, ECE’s business-ﬁrm parties and their governments do not feel that
they have to compromise national sovereignty, especially after they have become members
of the EU club. Newly emergent populist parties in Europe were usually led by charismatic
leaders. FIDESZ-Civic Party in Hungary is led by Viktor Orbán, the party of Law and Justice (PiS)
in Poland is led by Jaroslaw Kaczynski, Action of Dissatisﬁed Citizens (ANO) in Czechia by
Andrej Babis. They all became prime ministers. Their personal character was usually a mix of
a ruthless ﬁghter taking on globalisation and communism. Their program suggested the
defence of national interests and the completion of the transition process. At ﬁrst sight, these
goals can be interpreted as a correction to FDI-led development and liberal competition state
(Drahokupil, 2008), as well as their replacement with a new system that concentrates on
strengthening the local bourgeoisie and national sovereignty against foreign inﬂuence.
Viktor Orbán’s quoted statement about illiberal democracy reﬂects such a strong value
statement. The ECE’s transition was designed according to the values of the Western
civilisation, liberal democracies, liberal market economies and the competition state.
There are, however, other types of political and economic systems in the world that are
constructed according to diﬀerent values. Sometimes it is rather diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate
among various types of capitalist models (see debates of the VoC literature). We can
identify ‘Western’ or liberal democracies, where there is political competition among
political parties, free elections that decide control over governments and parties, market
competition and there is also a second tier of social control: civil society. Moreover,
legislative and executive branches of the state are separated, there is independent
jurisdiction, free press and freedom of opinion. All these features establish a system of
checks and balances that restricts monopolisation in polity and also in the economy. The
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system is based on physical institutions, but also on soft social institutions (historic
behavioural patterns and track records).
The quality of institutions is strongly inﬂuenced by past political, social and economic
development patterns. In the case of ECE countries, this means that their societies’
imprinted behavioural patterns (their convictions) are less supportive for liberal demo-
cratic values than classic democracies. ECE history shows continuous shuttling of the
countries between the West (liberal democracy) and East (autocracy). Poland’s Pilsudski
regime and Hungary’s Horthy regime were obviously autocratic regimes run by
a charismatic leader, despite them having functional parliamentary and political party
systems. Elements of appreciation towards these autocracies are even present today. The
communist period is usually regarded as a dictatorship with no political and market
competition, albeit the political and economic power was monopolised by a group of
people, rather than a single charismatic leader (Gomulka, Kádár or Brezniew). In some ECE
countries, especially in Czechoslovakia the democratic track record was longer and
included the 1920s and 30s7. The current departure of Hungary and Poland from the
concept of liberal democracy can be interpreted as returning from democracy to auto-
cracy. We can even perceive concrete parallels with predecessing regimes 80 years earlier,
such as Kossuth Square’s – the square in front of the parliament building in Budapest –
reconstruction according to its Horthy-era layout. One may say that the oscillation is
a normal function of ECE societies; hence, there is nothing special or strange in the
concept of illiberal democracy.
But there are at least two important problems with this. One is that today’s world
economy and politics are globalised. Countries, especially small ones cannot survive as
closed economies any more. Small open economies must pursue policies that adjust to the
imperatives of globalisation. The other important diﬀerence is political: the signing of the
Maastricht Treaty and joining the European Union requires accepting Western liberal
democracy and a liberal market economy. On the converse, the European Union is not
prepared to manage members that negate the basic values of the great European compro-
mise. It is not prepared, because designers of the integration process could not imagine that
member countries will ever debate the fundamental premises of the Union. The EU is slow
to take measures against member states which openly violate its rules and go against the
integration treaty, both literally and ﬁguratively. European values were attacked by both
states becoming members of this club and from within the institutions themselves. One
may suspect that the weak EU response also reﬂects strong business interests.
As far as the economy is concerned, during and after 2008–2009 crisis ECE countries’
governments have gone against the current and did not limit increased state economic
intervention, but rather continued and even increased it after crisis shocks eased. An
important area of increased state intervention was public property management. Poland
was reported to have undertaken steps aimed at strengthening statist policies in state
property management. Some of these measures were already taken by the Civic Platform
before the crisis (Naczyk, 2014). The current right-wing populist PiS government contin-
ued and expanded these policies. Hungary’s populist government also introduced pro-
tectionist policies in favour of local businesses, that run counter to various EU regulations
(mainly in the ﬁeld of competition policy). Mihályi (2015) highlights that the socialist-
liberal Hungarian governments of the 2000s had already pursued such interventionist
policies8 . Thus, the departure from the neoliberal suit started before the crisis both in
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Hungary and Poland. The tendency can be regarded as a general political and societal
reaction to the far reaching application of neoliberal policies. It revitalised the deeply
embedded social appreciation of various forms of state paternalism that was depressed
during the ﬁrst decade of ECE’s transition.
Increased state intervention in the economy is currently referred to as ‘economic
patriotism’ (Clift & Woll, 2012; Naczyk, 2014). Clift and Woll (2012) clearly diﬀerentiate
classic ‘economic nationalism’, the roots of which go back to Adam Smith and
Friedrich List. For further analysis we can use the deﬁnition of economic patriotism
given by Clift and Woll (2012, p. 308) as follows: ‘We deﬁne economic patriotism as
economic choices which seek to discriminate in favour of particular social groups,
ﬁrms or sectors understood by the decision-makers as insiders because of their
territorial status’. The concept of economic patriotism can include a wide range of
state intervention including liberal economic policies that are applied selectively
(Helleiner & Pickel, 2005). The novelty of present day economic patriotism over old-
fashioned economic nationalism is that it is a response to the reconﬁguration of
economic governance and market interdependence. Governments became creative
to assure traditional economic policy objectives with new means. In Europe, they can
today transfer particular objectives from the national to the supranational level.
Deregulation and liberalisation may itself serve the creation of new types of discrimi-
nation (Levy, 2006). Deregulation is not limited to removing restrictions, but also their
replacement with active reregulation that can be designed to promote particular
outcomes. Economic patriotism represents a shift from classic protectionist trade
barriers to indirect measures, such as discriminative product and process standards
or state subsidies (as part of overall aid policy).
As shown above, practices that gave rise to the concept of economic patriotism are not
new. They characterise all market economies not just ECE countries. New is the way of
openly selling the idea and thereby entering deliberate conﬂicts with international
organisations. SomeWestern governments also pursued policies that openly contradicted
the EU’s liberal competition policy rules, for instance. These clashes could usually be
interpreted as political messages to the electorate that lacked serious intention of
realisation. ECE governments have taken similar actions, but on a much larger scale and
with diﬀerent intent. They are aware of the diﬃculties arising from such measures’
implementation under the current EU framework; nevertheless, they aim to send political
messages to both their electorate and Brussels. Moreover, certain unlawful steps are
introduced to achieve an intended eﬀect but are withdrawn before fully realised. The
number of new non-compliance actions undermine classic market economic institutions
and erode the rule of law in these countries.
Another important purpose of economic patriotism in ECE is the reconﬁguration of
power relations. In this sense, the practice of the Hungarian and Polish governments goes
beyond the rationale described above. The Hungarian case shows that selective measures
have been applied to favour particular agents. This stands in contrast with the notion that
economic patriotism uses distributive measures to favour territorially determined groups
of actors. The aim of such steps is not the conveyance of a general backing for the broad
citizenry, but the promotion of selected clients and members of the local loyal elite.
The application of covert protectionism is occasionally justiﬁed with the historical,
albeit not repeatable in today’s context, success stories of the classic East-Asian
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developmental state. An important characteristic of this model was establishing regulated
competition on a protected internal market ﬁrst, and opening to the world market in
the second phase. However, the patronage state kills market competition all together,
because domestic clients are protected from foreign and domestic competition alike.
Without competition, economic agents will solely rely on maintaining good relations with
their patrons and do not enter the trying path of innovation and activity sophistication.
The result is declining competitiveness, deteriorating product and service quality,
decreasing income generation, as well as overall impoverishment. The concept of eco-
nomic patriotism never negated competition’s role as a driving force in market econo-
mies. The Hungarian example cannot be regarded as an example of economic patriotism,
because the patronage state eliminated competition. Moreover, this practice can also be
regarded as corrupt in case measures granted to businesses are then compensated.
‘What they call corruption is practically the main policy of FIDESZ. I mean that the
government set such goals like the establishment of local bourgeoisie, building of strong
Hungary’s pillars on the countryside or in industry . . . This is a political viewpoint, truly
a mystiﬁcation of the word corruption’ (András Lánczi, president of Századvég
Alapítvány – the home-grown think-tank of FIDESZ; Lánczi, 2015). This statement clearly
identiﬁes the two contradicting views on current ‘economic patriotism’ in Hungary.
Critiques do not necessarily agree that open or covert protectionism is useful for the
society as a whole, but the kind of patronage that hampers competition under this label
has nothing to do with national interest. It serves group, party or even personal interest.
Several cases of ECE governments’ actions run the risk of corruption. Before going into the
empirical details, it is necessary to describe the ECE system of crony capitalism and
patronage that opens up the way for corruption.
3. The creation of political monopoly, a system of patronage and new forms
of paternalism in the economy
The dominance of the polity over the economy – i.e. business capture – is made possible
by the monopolisation of political power. In order to maintain political monopoly,
governments which were led by ‘business-ﬁrm’ parties in ECE countries begun rolling
back democratic political institutions. Kornai (2015) describes the process of dissolving
democratic institutions in Hungary. The Hungarian case can be regarded as an archetype,
since the distinguished majority of the governing party allowed the government to
fundamentally change the legal system. The constitution was rewritten and passed by
FIDESZ MPs’ ‘voting machine’9 in the parliament. Less powerful majorities in other ECE
countries (Poland, Romania) did not have the same opportunities to alter the legal system,
according to their interests. In Hungary, the executive and legislative branches were
essentially fused and became controlled by the governing party through changes in
personnel. This applies to the constitutional court, the state audit oﬃce, the ﬁscal council,
the competition oﬃce, the monetary council, the National Bank of Hungary, the ombuds-
man’s oﬃce and the central statistical oﬃce. FIDESZ passed 88 bills up to a week after
their introduction, during the party’s four-year mandate between 2010 and 2014.
The new constitution was complemented by 32 so-called cardinal laws that can only be
changed with two thirds of the votes in parliament (Kornai, 2015). The distinguished
majority in parliament has allowed the governing party to change any law, whenever
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required by its political or other (e.g. business) interests. Thus, people in power are now
above the law. In several cases, laws were changed retroactively to justify unlawful,
fraudulent actions of party members. All this seriously undermined the basic principles
of the rule of law. Jurisdiction had also been put under party control: the Chief Prosecutor
was chosen and appointed by the charismatic leader – Viktor Orban – and approved by
the parliament’s voting machine. The prosecution service regularly rejects the investiga-
tions on fraudulent cases, where clients of governing party’s members are accused.
Members of the Supreme Court were also selected and approved by the FIDESZ-
controlled parliament. Members of the judicial colleges were also selected in a partisan
manner: a new law reduced the age threshold of active judges from 70 to just 62,
expelling the older less loyal generation from duty. Poland’s populist PiS government
also introduced many of these measures recently.
The signiﬁcant changes in the structure and personnel of the institutional system created
centralised power structures, a pyramid-like vertical hierarchy with the charismatic leader
(and few of his college-mates) at the top. Below him stand unconditionally loyal executors of
the patron’s will. Every level of the power pyramid is then ﬁlled by people chosen for their
loyalty to the regime. Only the charismatic leader at the very top does not depend on any
superior and only the lowest level employees do not give orders to anyone. All others are
incorporated into the hierarchy as both servant and master. They all aim to maintain their
positions or move further up on the hierarchical ladder. They are not elected, but their
positions depend on winning and maintaining the trust of their superior by uncritical
obedience. This is the typical structure in all Hungarian public services. A robust system,
because it builds on the fear of those that are most dependent on it.
Properly working democracies have a double control system. Besides the inbuilt checks
and balances (legally incorporated control devices), civil society organisations also play an
important role. But NGOs are regarded by the FIDESZ government as public enemies.
FIDESZ-controlled mass media launched a massive campaign stigmatising them as enemy
agencies of foreign powers. Masters of the hate rhetoric were not disturbed by the fact
that many of the aﬀected institutions were sponsored by Hungarian NATO- or EU-allies.
No distinguishing nuances regarding their scope of activities were diﬀerentiated either:
NGOs in the ﬁeld of poverty reduction, education, preservation of the Hungarian cultural
heritage were treated in the same manner as anti-corruption organisations. Any support
that came through uncontrolled channels was suspicious. The stigmatisation of foreign-
sponsored civil society organisations was reinforced through legal actions as well10.
Viktor Orbán’s almost unlimited political licence was used to the destruction of demo-
cratic institutions and massive brainwashing in Hungary, in order to cement his and his
mates’ political leadership and establish autocracy in the country. This continued despite
the loud, but rather ineﬃcient protest of local opposition and the international commu-
nity. Unfortunately, similar tendencies and practices emerged in other ECE countries as
well, indicating that there might be a kind of common systemic similarity in the region
(weak democratic institutions and historical precedents of autocracy). The process of
destruction was less pervasive in Poland, mainly because of the Polish government’s
limited power. Nevertheless, the PiS government openly declared that it would love to
carbon copy the Hungarian antidemocratic development pattern (Budapest in Warsaw,
Naczyk, 2014). Blaszczyk (2017) provides a comprehensive listing of the antidemocratic
measures taken by the Polish PiS government that show considerable similarity with the
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Hungarian government’s measures. The Polish constitutional court and the judicial sys-
tem at large, the competition oﬃce as well as the Polish ﬁnancial supervision authority
were weakened when their scope of action was curbed and key positions were ﬁlled by
cronies of the government. The Hungarian example was also copied through actions
against the free media, the weakening of NGOs and in the centralisation of public services
from local governments to nation-wide institutions (health, education, and utilities).
Destruction of the rule of law and public support of corruption is present in other ECE
countries as well. In the case of Romania, for example, Tudorel Toader Minister of Justice
suggested the ﬁring of Laura Codruta-Kövesi, president of the Romanian Anti-corruption
Prosecution (DNA) in February 2018. One of the main objections against her was DNA
overstepping its role, when she initiated prosecution with regard to the passing
a government decree in January 2017 that lifted prosecution control on corruption
cases valued at less than RON 200.000 (EUR 50.000). In essence, this amendment of the
penal code meant a quasi-legalisation of small-scale corruption. Other objections
included her non-loyal behaviour and the accusation that her actions caused the defama-
tion of Romania abroad. The Romanian president ﬁrst rejected the minister’s request, but
a few months later Codruta-Kövesi was dismissed by the Romanian president.
Hungarian and Polish governments were also active in demolishing market economic
institutions, most importantly the rule of law, which they replaced with a patronage system.
An important ﬁeld of action in this regard was state property management. Previous
research has pointed out that privatisation logic’s reversal aimed to achieve the transition
process’ opposite (Blaszczyk, 2017; Baltowski & Kozarzewski, 2017; Kornai, 2015; Szanyi,
2016a). In the 1990s, privatisation was not only reinforced to create responsibly acting
market agents but to reduce the state sector to prevent the survival of paternalistic links
between business and polity (Szanyi, 2016a). The reversal of privatisation’s logic meant an
ambition to increase the size of the state sector so the system of patronage could capture
a larger part of it. We call this ambition business capture. In general, business capture has
devastating eﬀects on property right enforcement and the rule of law. As Rapaczynski (1996)
emphasises that state property management practices and governments’ track record
concerning private property (especially forbearance from encroachments) plays an out-
standing role in strengthening the soft social institution of property right enforcement
(obeying the law). Expanding the state sector sends a badmessage to themarket, especially
if it is achieved by curbing private property rights. This is exactly what has happened on
mass scale in both Hungary and Poland (Blaszczyk, 2017; Baltowski & Kozarzewski, 2016,
2017; Kornai, 2015; Mihályi, 2015; Szanyi, 2016a, 2016c; Voszka, 2013).
The Hungarian government declared privatisation completed in 2008 (Hungarian
Government, 2009), although substantial state ownership remained in place. Therefore,
the statement could be also understood as an intention to give way for nationalisation.
Indeed, this happened sporadically until 2010 and then on a larger scale under the rule of
the FIDESZ government. The asset value of re-nationalised property was large, but still
a magnitude smaller than assets privatised after 1990. Assessing a list of re-nationalisations
(Mihályi, 2015, p. 17) shows that between 2010 and 2014, 209 companies were aﬀected and
the total value of the transactions was slightly over 1573 bn HUF (cca. 5 bn Euro). This
amount included sales price paid to previous owners, increases of share capital and other
commitments as well. The numbers and amounts seem to be very high especially, if we
consider that Hungarian governments accumulated excessive public debt already prior to
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2008–2009 crisis. However, as Mihályi (2015) explains, these transactions did not increase
state gross debt, since they represented a change in the asset structure, a kind of securities
swap formore liquid assets. The list of transactions shows that the overwhelmingmajority of
the ﬁnancial commitments stemmed from transactions in the energy and banking sectors
(1366 bn HUF, or 4.5 bn Euro), with the large number of the aﬀected companies boosted by
numerous small saving banks (137 ﬁnancial institutions altogether).
Various political aims explain re-nationalisation. The ﬁrst large transaction was the
nationalisation of the second pillar of the pension system at the turn of 2010/2011. The
oﬃcial narrative suggested that the pension savings were not secure and did not yield the
expected returns in the hands of the private pension funds; therefore, they had to be
redirected to the ﬁrst, government-controlled, pillar. Account holders of private pension
funds were instructed to withdraw their deposits and channel these savings to the state
pension system. 2,8 million acted accordingly, with deposits moved adding up to approxi-
mately 3000 bn HUF (10 bn Euro) or the equivalent 10% of Hungarian GDP. The risk they
face is losing their pension rights in the pay-as-you-go state pension system. Most
observers believe that the ‘voluntary’ nationalisation of private pension funds was
aimed at using the obtained assets for debt relief (which was partly accumulated by
ﬁnancing the social security system).
Several transactions and regulatory changes were taken under the umbrella of limiting
utility costs. FIDESZ promised savings on utility costs as a major part of its campaign tool
in both 2010 and 2014 election campaigns. The government prohibited price increases of
public utilities. Later, prices were reduced by government agencies – eliminating proﬁts
from this sector. This was the ﬁrst measure that directly aﬀected the proﬁtability of private
businesses. New taxes were later introduced on ﬁnancial transactions, mobile telephone
calls, ATM cash withdrawals and advertisement revenues of the media, amongst others.
All these actions undermined the proﬁtability of aﬀected companies. Owners soon felt
encouraged to sell their loss-generating assets. The process is referred to as regulatory
taking: company revenues dry up, because of unfavourable changes in market regulations
or excessive taxes. Many privately held utility ﬁrms were thus sold to central or local public
bodies, with some of them receiving generous compensations (for example, the
German RWE).
In 2013, the government applied regulatory capture again, when the deposits of local
ﬁnancial cooperatives were targeted. First, the state increased the level of compulsory
deposit levels. Since the small banks could not meet the new obligation overnight, the
state itself provided themwith the necessary capital and connected this transaction to the
acquisition of a controlling share of ownership. Owners of the small banks were not asked
beforehand but were provided an ultimatum if they were to reject the oﬀer. In 2014, the
Hungarian state acquired MKB Bank from its German owners. The German parent bank
was unwilling to operate its subsidiary at losses and sold it to the only serious buyer: the
Hungarian state. The losses were, however, caused by various negative changes in the
business environment initiated by the Hungarian government (extra tax on banks’ proﬁts,
tax on ﬁnancial transactions and through the restitution of those indebted in Swiss-
Francs). Later that year FHB Bank was purchased by the Hungarian Post, increasing
national ownership to over 60% of bank assets.
The nationalised utility ﬁrms were in foreign ownership, and the regulatory takings
against them heralded a third important consideration that seems to have explanatory
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power: unfriendly relationships with selected foreign companies. The Hungarian govern-
ments repeatedly enacted market regulations and changed the tax system, curbing
revenues of large multinational ﬁrms and thus creating more favourable conditions for
domestic capital owners. Nevertheless, this sentiment was targeted towards certain types
of companies: ﬁnancial institutions, media ﬁrms, large retail chains and telecom compa-
nies. Governmental communication explained their negative treatment by suggesting
that these ﬁrms did not contribute to the material (real economic) production platform of
the Hungarian economy. This kind of populist confrontation with various sectors has not
been used since the beginning of the transition process.
The rather grave list of nationalisations and anti-market measures taken by the
Hungarian government can be continued with similar cases in other ECE countries. The
Polish government’s aim to increase the size of the state sector and curtail the activity of
multinational businesses was very similar. Moreover, actions such as conﬁscating
the second private pillar of the pension system, introduction of sector-speciﬁc extra
taxes aﬀecting mainly multinational companies, regulatory capture in the case of public
utility service providers were copied (Blaszczyk, 2017; Baltowski & Kozarzewski, 2017).
Baltowski and Kozarzewski (2016) also state that minority shareholding resulted in eﬀec-
tive state control in a fairly large number of Polish ﬁrms, alongside those where the
majority was acquired. According to their estimations, in addition to state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs), state-controlled ﬁrms increased state inﬂuence by a further 50%. Moreover,
state control is signiﬁcantly higher in big business, making state positions even more
inﬂuential (Baltowski & Kozarzewski, 2016, p. 416).
4. Business capture and changing forms of rent-seeking
Material rents stemming from political power positions occur in all political systems. The
extent of the rents, as well as channels of rent-seeking depend on the eﬃciency of
political and social control and democratic institutions. Their role in a modern political
democracy is to curtail prevailing private (or closed group) interests over societies. Strong
control institutions are important because they limit the opportunities of rent-seeking;
political competition increases its political risks. However, this does not entail the elimina-
tion of drivers. The transition process in East Central Europe could be interpreted as
a competition for the redistribution of economic power. Privatisation meant the redis-
tribution of existing assets, a process designed and executed by state institutions. It was
the ﬁrst main area of competition for personal wealth-generation through state agencies
in transition economies.
In this setting of ‘competition state’ the ‘comprador elite’s’ material wellbeing and
enrichment was based on the existence and strong inﬂuence of multinational companies.
Salaried positions on ﬁrms’, their advisory background institutions’ as well as in banks’
boards and in their management were provided. Business and administrative positions
were ﬁlled and there were regular exchanges of personnel between administrative and
business positions (Drahokupil, 2008). The main beneﬁciaries of this setup were the
segments of the elite which supported multinational business to gain inﬂuence in ECE
countries. Mainly ideologically liberal parties took this role, but other larger parties that
did not refrain from liberal policies also became involved. The other main grouping of
parties – the conservative-nationalist and Christian-democratic parties – preferred
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strengthening the national bourgeoisie and typically did not enter the ‘comprador elite’.
‘Business ﬁrm’ parties of ECE usually supported the nationalist agenda.
There is some empirical evidence indicating that politicians and clients in various
countries took the positions on corporate boards and advisory committees. Of course, it
is much easier to take controlling positions in state-owned companies. It can be regarded
as general practice to change not only the supervision but the complete management of
SOEs after changes in government. Skuhrovec (2014), for example, reported peeks of
personnel change in Czech SOE supervisory boards after election years. This practice on
the one hand eliminates the conﬂicts between management and politicians but also
provides an opportunity to milk the SOE through various channels. An SOE is ﬁt for this
purpose regardless of its potential eﬃciency. The social cost of this practice is not just
foregone proﬁts, but continuous cash ﬂow is injected from various state institutions (i.e.
the state budget) that are transferred from the SOE to private uses. SOEs may ﬁnance
various social and cultural events, deliver red carpet treatment to politicians, donate to
charity organisations or support various activities of the government and politicians. SOEs
are also used for the rewarding politicians’ clients, by ﬁnancing expert fees, amongst
others.
Main areas of rent-seeking thus shifted from property acquisition and tunnelling, or
entering the interest sphere of multinational business popular in the 1990s’ privatisation
to controlling and running enterprises. As it was shown in the previous section, the
privatisation logic was reversed during the 2000s. Slowing privatisation in Poland and
nationalisations in Hungary aimed to maintain and expand the inﬂuence of the party-
controlled state, while ensuring rent-seeking from SOEs.
In this period, state ownership served the enrichment of elites that previously did not
join the ‘comprador elite group’. Of course, the decline of available state assets to be
privatised also contributed to this. Assets that remained in state hands by the late-2000s
were mostly notorious loss-making companies (like mines in Poland) that were not worth
insider ownership. Another part, was large service providers that could not be easily
transferred to rent-seeking private hands but were very much suitable SOEs for mass scale
milking.
Stark and Vedres (2012) provide an interesting and detailed empirical study intended
to elaborate party-dominated companies’ external networks in Hungary. In earlier papers,
Stark called attention to the possibility of previous SOEs’ incumbent managements’
survival and the transfer of their economic power into new business forms through
informal networks (Stark, 1996; Stark & Bruszt, 1998). This concept was changed in the
light of new empirical ﬁndings: the dominant networks of the 2000s do not pose
a political threat of systemic reversal. The new networks, even if they are controlled by
former SOE’s managers or communist party members, work in a manner where they are
embedded into the then new economic environment. The spread of partisan ﬁrms
alongside SOEs is a new development, stemming from politicians and their clients directly
controlling signiﬁcant parts of private business. This sector is also used for rent-seeking.
The survey of Stark and Vedres (2012) was conducted with data including 1696 large
and medium-sized companies in Hungary for the period between 1987 and 2001. Party
members and clients took controlling positions in less than 10% of ﬁrms at the eve of
systemic transformation (1989), but this number steadily grew to almost 20% by 2001. In
terms of capitalisation, the share of politicised ﬁrms grew from less than 10% in 1989 to
POST-COMMUNIST ECONOMIES 13
over 40% in 2001. The authors diﬀerentiated between the political inﬂuence of the then
competing main coalitions (right and left) and found that after elections, winning parties’
inﬂuence accelerated and losers’ declined. However, the magnitude of the ﬂuctuation
declined over time, becoming less dependent on government changes. In my interpreta-
tion, this meant a marked shift from control over SOEs, towards privately owned compa-
nies – the management of which remained largely immune from political changes.
However, this phenomenon needs further analysis.
During the ﬁrst decade of transition in post-communist ECE economies, democratic
and market institutions evolved, business systems and political systems were largely
separated, albeit they inﬂuenced each other. Firms competed for capital, labour, suppliers
and customers, parties competed with each other in democratic electoral system for
political power in order to fulﬁl their programs. The main assumption of this view (the
‘legacy concept’ elaborated by Eyal, Szelényi, & Townsley, 1998; Stark, 1996; Stark & Bruszt,
1998) was that increasing sophistication of the two institutional systems will lead to
declining business-polity interaction that was regarded a main risk of the systemic
change, a potential route from ‘plan to clan’ instead of ‘plan to market’ (Stark, 1991).
The clan-concept returned in the analyses of the transition during the 2000s, but in
a completely diﬀerent setting (Sallai & Schnyder, 2015; Stark & Vedres, 2012). Business-
polity relationships intensiﬁed and featured new characteristics: increasing political and
material rent-seeking, polarised character, large-scale personal entanglement, coevolu-
tion of political and economic structures. I call this new type of relationship party business
capture rather than a clan economy. The business capture concept better reﬂects the
dominance of political parties over signiﬁcant parts of the economy (Yakovlev, 2006).
Despite the political consensus in the 1990s of developing democratic institutions
based on competing political parties and a market economy based on free competition
(the ‘competition state’) the coevolution process of the two systems soon directed the
attention of both business and polity to potential alliances. The concept of sharply
separated ﬁelds of business and polity was undercut in the two spheres. Business needed
insider knowledge and government support in its competition to grow its markets (e.g. in
public procurements). Meanwhile, polity needed funds for party ﬁnancing, election
campaigns and rewarding political allies and clients. The coevolution process meant
a development of occasional transactions towards long-term alliances. While the eco-
nomic and political ﬁelds remained institutionally separated, ﬁrms and parties became
organisationally entangled.
In Hungary, during the ﬁrst period of the transition, the relationship was dominated
mostly by business (Sallai & Schnyder, 2015). This was the heyday of the ‘comprador elite’,
with a strong role also played by multinational business. Stark and Vedres (2012) also
show that struggle over dominance of SOEs became a less signiﬁcant way of combining
political and economic power by the end of the 1990s. Besides multinational ﬁrms’
inﬂuence, partisan private ﬁrms started to capture the lion’s share of politicised business
in Hungary during the 2000s. After 2010, the Hungarian government started to increase
government control a over multinational business as well. In an attempt to split the strong
representation of foreign ﬁrms and undermine their political inﬂuence, the Hungarian
government introduced selective advantage and disadvantage measures (Szanyi, 2016b).
In many cases, measures introduced intended to support allied Hungarian partisan ﬁrms’
market positions against foreign-owned competitors (e.g. in retail trade and banking). But
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selected multinational ﬁrms were also treated as ‘friendly business’. The ‘strategic partner-
ship program’ of the Hungarian government re-established the lobbying platforms of
selected foreign ﬁrms. In exchange, the government requested support for politically
important programs.
Business-polity relationships of the 2000s have been increasingly dominated by parti-
san business in Hungary. The emergence of partisanship led to business’ increasing
politicisation: political parties captured business and the conversion of state power into
economic power. The economy – like the political arena – became increasingly polarised.
Cooperation patterns among partisan ﬁrms followed political alliances in the system of
business capture: ﬁrms of political allies conduct business with each other, but not with
ﬁrms of the opposition (Stark & Vedres, 2012).
Wedel (2001) distinguished between two qualitatively diﬀerent stages of business cap-
ture in Central and Eastern Europe. The return of state capitalism in this part of the world
was linked to a more profound transformation of the state and the underlying party-driven
elite structure than in cases of other regions and periods (e.g. models of the developmental
state in South-East Asia or authoritarian regimes in emerging states). In the ﬁrst stage,
informal groups take over certain functions or collaborate with state authorities, but the
group is not synonymous with authorities. This relationship can also be classiﬁed as state
capture: state authorities work under the inﬂuence of business interest groups.
Wedel’s second stage ‘clan state’ is one where certain clans (interest groups) are so closely
identiﬁed with particular state authorities or institutional segments of the state that ‘the
respective agendas of the government and the clan become indistinguishable’ (p. 11.). The
‘clan state’ is controlled in most obvious cases by a charismatic leader and their subordi-
nated political allies grouped in political parties (typically in business ﬁrm parties). The
concept of ‘clan state’ corroborates with Schoenman’s concept of the patronage state
(Schoenman, 2014). Both concepts describe various aspects of business capture.
The ‘clan state’ as a form of business capture can be the product of the business-polity
coevolution process, beginning with largely independent actors working on meeting
mutual interests. If polity dominates the relation, political interest is expressed through
personal and largely informal pressure. The political support that once independent ﬁrms
wished to obtain may transform into a golden cage. ‘Firms have to be “locked into” this
golden cage of political ties to survive, but these ties allow the state at the same time
a close control over ﬁrms’ (Sallay & Schnyder, 2015, p. 5.). This process was also described
through Russia’s example by Yakovlev (2006). But state (party) control over ﬁrms can also
be developed intentionally: many of the partisan ﬁrms were established to serve various
rent-seeking purposes. New forms of rent-seeking require loyal partisan ﬁrms.
When privatisation and other forms of state asset appropriation were exhausted, new
forms of elite enrichment were discovered. These forms were bound to existing and
functioning business entities; that is, rents stem from operational as opposed to capital
transactions. Since the number of SOEs could hardly be expanded (despite of nationalisa-
tions in Hungary), party-controlled private business took the lead in obtaining rents. New
forms of rents were bound to ongoing business activity: much of them could be realised
in legally undisputable ways through means of ‘legal corruption’ (Kaufmann & Vicente,
2011). Legal corruption is based on a broader deﬁnition of corruption, which includes
transactions that may not be illegal. This includes public actors’ transactions which serve
private interests at the expense of the public interest.
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Public procurement through partisan ﬁrms became a form of rent-seeking after the
ECE’s accession to the European Union. Up until then, structural policies used mostly ﬁscal
measures, providing supported industries and companies tax holidays on both state and
local levels. The most well-known example of this tool kit was investment promotion
policy (Antalóczy, Sass, & Szanyi, 2011). Tax measures can alter competitive positions on
markets, but they are rather ‘governments’ tools’. They redistribute future incomes, which
in most cases would not exist otherwise. Redistribution of existing incomes – that is
ﬁnancial support schemes – spread on a mass scale only after 2004 when ECE state
policies were streamlined with the acquis of the EU. The preference of ﬁnancial support
meant an opportunity to redistribute real money. Simultaneously, EU structural funds
were opened for the new member states greatly widening potential ﬁnancial sources.
Party-controlled ﬁrms, for example, could be ﬁlled with public procurement orders if
tender conditions were formulated in speciﬁc ways. Limiting competition or even the
complete elimination of it in public procurement tenders is a frequently used tool of legal
corruption in Hungary (Fazekas, King, & Tóth, 2013). There is ample evidence of market
share in the case of companies participating in public procurement tenders (op. cit. 76.o.).
This reﬂects the changing preferences of the political leadership for particular clients’
ﬁrms (for details see: Sallai & Schnyder, 2015). The analysis of EU sponsored projects in
Hungary showed that 33,8% of contracts signed between 2009 and 2012 received only
one bid (no competition). Furthermore, 17,7% of contracts were modiﬁed after being
granted, oﬀering a mode to extract rents (Fazekas et al., 2013, p. 78.).
Further empirical evidence of partisan ﬁrms’ increasing activity in public tenders was
collected by Tóth and Hajdu (2018). Their database consists of 126 330 contracts for the
years between 2010 and 2016. The presence of potential corruption was indicated by
several independent measures. The ﬁrst of them was the number of contracts involving
a single bidder. The share of such contracts ﬂuctuated between 20% and 40%, with the
highest values occurring in the election years (2010 and 2014). The index of a relative price
drop (achieved price reduction via competitive bidding) was marginally low in at least half
of all cases and showed a signiﬁcant drop from 2010 onwards. This data did not only reﬂect
an ever-decreasing eﬃciency of tenders but also indicates growing corruption: winners
regularly provided bids, the prices of which only slightly diﬀered from the estimated
contract value. This is interpreted by the authors as insider knowledge of tender conditions.
Tóth and Hajdu (2018) paid special attention to the activity of four groups of ﬁrms that
were related to/owned by the family members of the Hungarian prime minister or their
trustees. The four interest groups won 510 contracts (0,4% of the total) worth of HUF 2,5
bn (5,1%). The authors’ model showed that corruption was higher than the already high
average in the case of this interest group. Intensity of competition in tenders was lower
and the relative price drop was negligible. The negatively perceived impacts of business
capture were strongest in the business related to the highest political levels.
5. Conclusions
This paper stresses that the current deviation from democratic political system and
competitive market economy in ECE has several indigenous and historic reasons. In this
sense, it can be regarded as a rather common feature of the ECE model of capitalism. The
continuous shuttling between Western democratic values and autocracy has always been
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a central political problem of the region. The transition process introduced a Western-
style liberal path during the 1990s, mainly because there was a fundamental social and
political consensus in the region that saw the guarantee of making the political transition
irreversible in this policy. During the 2000s this belief lost inﬂuence, moreover, there was
a general discreditation of the neoliberal paradigm due to 2008–2009 world economic
crisis. Democratic institutions and the liberal market economy’s appeal declined in ECE
countries after the Great Recession.
In the political sphere, business-ﬁrm populist parties’ political support increased. The “mass
elite’ behind them does not share ideological values but has developed rather eclectic
conceptions of political and social development. Their main interest (like other political
parties’) is to prolong their political and economic inﬂuence for as long as possible. But by
doing so they change the democratic institutional system of checks and balances, while trying
to dominate all social and political spheres: legislation, the executive branch, jurisdiction, mass
media and the economy. This paper analysed the modes of economic dominance.
Economic dominance is based on party business capture, but it is closely linked to
dominant positions in polity as well. Policies are pursued and regulations are altered to
free partisan business from unnecessary competition. This activity is frequently explained
on the grounds of economic patriotism and the classic model of the (East-Asian) devel-
opmental state. I argue that blocking competition entirely and applying selective mea-
sures to political clients cannot be misunderstood as economic patriotism. This is rather
the establishment of patronage state instead of a competition state. The main aim of
business capture is rent-seeking.
ECE’s autocratic regimes and party business capture lead to an economic (and perhaps
a political) dead end. In the globalised world, the lack of competitiveness quickly erodes
incomes that will manifest sooner or later in declining living standards, an ineﬃcient
economy and a horrible dictum of increasing dependence on global markets. Today, ECE
autocratic regimes’ economic performance is not bad, thanks to the widespread activity of
highly competitive multinational business and the massive EU transfers that keep these
economies running. In the case of Poland, a rather sizeable independent national bour-
geoisie also helps stimulates the economy.
By the time of writing of this manuscript, Hungary – the archetype country of illiberal
democracy – was preparing for new parliamentary elections. The stake of the elections was
the further creation of a patronage system in the illiberal democracy as well as the further
concentration of political and economic power in the hands of the patron and his allies.
Political and social control over themonopolisation of power has been drastically weakened
during the past 8 years. The FIDESZ-KDNP alliance won 2018 elections with a two third
majority again, conveying illiberal democracy’s stable position in Hungary. The election
results showed similarities with the Brexit referendum in Britain and the last US presidential
elections: main supporters of the authoritarian regime and its populist, paternalistic election
promises, were those with below average welfare conditions and low levels of education:
the losers of globalisation.
Notes
1. The term was introduced to political science with pejorative connotation by Fareed Zakaria:
‘Democratically elected regimes . . . are routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power
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and depriving their citizens of basic rights and freedoms . . . .we see the rise of a disturbing
phenomenon in international life – illiberal democracy’ (Zakaria, 1997, p. 22).
2. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Czechia, Hungary and Slovenia, in 2007 Romania
and Bulgaria.
3. Szalavetz introduced the term ‘low value capture trap’ of the ECE countries. This meant that
ECE region occupied the least knowledge-intensive sections of global value chains that
created below average income levels. Unfortunately, the spread of local activities alongside
the value chain added new activities with equally depressed new value-generating potential,
hence the term ’low value capture trap’.
4. Previous attempts to identify features of ECE capitalism tried to subordinate and categorize
these countries according to the various existing types of capitalist systems (based on Hall and
Soskice’s seminal work, and their followers) and paid less attention to ﬁguring out region-
speciﬁc features (e.g. Bohle & Greskovits, 2007, 2012; Farkas, 2011, 2016; Lane, 2005). Inclusion of
the role of the state was reduced mainly to the quality of governance and securing macro-
economic stability: factors of competitive business environment (e.g. Bohle & Greskovits, 2007).
5. A comprehensive volume with many country case studies on direct state intervention is
forthcoming: Szanyi (2019).
6. The term ’comprador service sector’ or ’comprador elite’ refers to local managers, experts,
representatives of international organisations, politicians working for or supporting multi-
national business in ECE host countries (see: Drahokupil, 2008).
7. Despite this, Cisar (2017) reported that trust and appreciation of democratic institutions in
Czechia has been also low allowing the populist ANO to win the support of especially the
young generation voters on 2013 elections. Similarly to Poland and Hungary, traditional
parties also lost much of their popularity due to serious corruption scandals.
8. A most striking action was the introduction of ‘Lex MOL’, an amendment of the commercial
code that changed corporate governance regulation in order to help the Hungarian oil
company repel the takeover ambitions of the Austrian competitor ÖMW. The legal changes
were passed in a rare mutual agreement of government and opposition.
9. MPs univocally co-vote following the instructions of the fraction leader.
10. For further details on how Viktor Orbán has destroyed democratic institutions and estab-
lished his system of patronage in Hungary see: Kingsley (2018) or Kornai (2015).
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